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Robert Knight 
 
Life after SOE: Peter Wilkinson’s journey from the Clowder Mission to Waldheim 
 
Dedicated to the memory of Peter Wilkinson (1914-2000) 
 
Introduction 
 
In December 1971 Peter Wilkinson wrote his valedictory dispatch as British Ambassador to 
Austria. In seven pages he surveyed Austria’s international position, including its relationship to 
the EEC and NATO, the development under Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of a policy of “active 
neutrality,” West German economic penetration and Soviet policies and attitudes, in particular 
Soviet fear of any revival of pan-Germanism. At the close of this largely benign survey comes an 
unexpected recollection: “By coincidence, I shall be leaving Vienna on the anniversary of my 
arrival in Bosnia on the 3rd December 1943 with orders to proceed to the Austrian frontier to 
stimulate Austrian resistance to Hitler’s occupation. Even twenty-eight years later it seems too 
good to be true that such a calamitous story should have such an outcome. Happy Austria 
indeed!”1 
The passage is striking, not just because it injects a surprisingly personal note into a fairly 
conventional diplomatic report, but even more because of the glaring gap between the first and 
second sentences. The first sentence referred to Wilkinson’s leadership of the “Clowder Mission,” 
an attempt to penetrate the southern borders of Greater Germany in order to establish an effective 
intelligence network. In this attempt, Wilkinson, a senior officer in the Special Operations 
Executive (SOE) and protégé Colin Gubbins, was following the famous verbal instruction given to 
SOE by Churchill - to “set Europe alive.”2 And the clear implication of the second sentence is that 
that Austria had attained its “present happy state” because Wilkinson’s efforts had born fruit. At 
any rate it is reasonable to assume that the recipients of the report in the Foreign Office drew this 
conclusion, because it conformed to the received wisdom about post-war Austria, both inside and 
outside Austria.. Yet, as I will argue here, such a reading was in contradiction with both 
Wilkinson’s own experience and his judgment of Austrian resistance against National Socialism.  
 
In seeking to explain the contradiction I make the following arguments. Firstly, Wilkinson took 
from his experience a thoroughly sceptical assessment of Austrian resistance efforts; secondly, as a 
professional diplomat, he adjusted his views pragmatically to the requirements of a Cold War 
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world, in which the Soviet Union was the enemy and Austria was a de facto Western ally; thirdly, 
by the time of the “Waldheim affair” in 1986 the tensions which this had created emerged more 
clearly to some outsiders observers, including Wilkinson himself (by then retired). 
 
By way of preamble, I should say that I first got to know Wilkinson in 1984, when I was 
researching for a PhD on post-war British policy towards Austria. As I was not then particularly 
interested in the Clowder Mission or the Special Operations Executive I did not ask him about it. 
Over the following 15 years I came to know him reasonably well, meeting him on a number of 
occasions including a memorable conference at Brdo, when he revisited the some of the sites of 
the Clowder Mission.3 If admiration and affection amount to a personal interest then I am happy to 
declare mine here. 
Formally the SOE was wound up at the end of the war or absorbed into the rival organization of 
MI6 but in the process, as Richard Aldrich puts it, “many components of SOE marched out of the 
Second World War into the Cold War without breaking step.”4 As far as we know Wilkinson was 
not among them. His own proposal to reinvent SOE in Austria for “a role in the occupational and 
post-occupational phase” was torpedoed by the Foreign Office at the highest level.5 Wilkinson 
himself joined the Diplomatic Service, starting as Director of the Political Branch of the British 
Element in Vienna. But it seems unlikely that he broke off his connections with the former SOE 
operatives who continued to work in Vienna, now an important intelligence gathering hub.6 As he 
put it in relation to the Information Research Department, where he later worked he enjoyed 
“closer connections with the intelligence community than most members of the foreign service.”7 
On the other hand, Wilkinson’s memoirs also suggest that a diplomatic career was the most 
attractive alternative to a return to the military career he had begun before the war. That appeared 
deeply unattractive to him since it would mean returning to the “anonymity” of regimental life and 
making himself familiar with the modern infantry warfare, from which his SOE experience had 
been so far removed.8 A letter he wrote many years later sheds further light on his antipathy to 
bureaucracy and routine: “After six years of war, most of us were used to order and counter-order 
from remote staff echelons, and had got into the habit of taking our own decisions and justifying 
them later if necessary [...] whereas in a battle you are hyped up and, so to speak, exceed yourself, 
seemingly indefatigable, my recollection is that after the German surrender I could no longer call 
on those reserves of energy; I was literally tired out. You cannot imagine the exhaustion or the 
sense of relief; you had survived and nothing would ever really matter again.”9 
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As an exercise in mental and physical hyper-activity the Clowder Mission was clearly hard to beat, 
involving as it did an arduous thousand mile trek across occupied territory, which with the help of 
partisan couriers took him from Bosnia up to just south of Carinthia.  
Wilkinson’s subsequent “Report on the Uprising in Slovenia” made his name in Whitehall, leading 
to an interview with General Alan Brooke, Chief of Imperial General Staff, and nearly to a lunch 
with Churchill himself.10 Nevertheless, measured against its aims, above all the creation of 
intelligence networks within Germany, Clowder was a failure and Wilkinson knew it. However in 
his memoirs he considered that failure was mitigated by the information it sent to London on the 
partisan resistance movement, the delivery of arms and supplies and, perhaps rather optimistically, 
the long-term positive impression on the partisan rank and file of the conduct of British officers.11 
By contrast he saw nothing positive about relations with the political commissars who were “most 
unsympathetic to British ideals and most hostile to our work in the Balkans.”12 
Wilkinson’s explanations for the mission’s failure bring us to the question of Austrian resistance: 
“[T]he spirit of resistance as we had come to know it in Western Europe simply did not exist in 
Austria which remained entirely passive until the Third Reich was in its final death throes.” The 
second reason which Wilkinson gives for the failure of the Clowder Mission was mutual mistrust 
and suspicion over the future  territorial settlement of Trieste and Venezia Giulia and southern 
Carinthia. At the same time he implies a degree of personal sympathy for the Slovene perspective, 
at least as far as Trieste is concerned: “[T] though I had not expected that Slovene territorial claims 
in Carinthia would be taken seriously, I had not thought that their demand for the return of Trieste 
would be rejected out of hand or that this divergence in our war aims would make it so difficult to 
allay Slovene suspicions about the motives of the Clowder Mission.” He even refers to his own 
“divided loyalties.”13 
 
Wilkinson’s lack of sympathy for the Yugoslav claim to southern Carinthia at the end of the war 
reflected not just his knowledge of the historical and political background but also his observation 
of the immense difficulty of stimulating resistance north of the Karawaken. The sceptical 
undertone of the following paragraph in his report describing a group of new Carinthian recruits to 
the partisan ranks is unmistakable: 
“At the present time recruits are mainly either volunteers or refugees from one of the German 
‘Wehrmannschaft’ mobilizations. In February I myself watched a party of the latter being 
shepherded down from Carinthia by the Partisans. Apart from a sprinkling of young boys, they 
were most of them middle-aged farmers roused from their beds in the middle of the night and 
forced to fly for their lives – unshaven and frozen from their first night in the open, unarmed, 
resentful and thoroughly miserable, it seemed impossible that they would ever make useful 
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soldiers, but I was informed that this unpromising material after a month with a Brigade and a 
course of ‘political instruction’ became as resolute and enthusiastic as the rest of the Partisans. 
Hm, perhaps.”14 
The subsequent fate of Wilkinson’s fellow-officer and close friend Alfgar Hesketh-Prichard 
(‘Major Cahusac’) confirms both the depth of partisan suspicions –far from conventional 
invocations of antifascist unity – and the sheer difficulty of waging partisan war in an area where 
much of the population was hostile or intimidated, or both. Having fulfilled his strong desire to 
cross the Drau River Hesketh-Prichard was almost certainly killed by the partisans on the Sau-
Alpe, probably at the end of 1944. 
It is unclear whether Wilkinson suspected this when he retraced Hesketh-Prichard’s steps after the 
end of the war. A post-war War Office investigation failed to turn up any conclusive evidence 
though rumours about it were certainly in circulation. By the 1980s Wilkinson had learnt enough 
to believe that “the circumstantial evidence points to the Partisans” and the reason for their action 
had been that “Alfgar had started trying to recruit anti-Nazi Austrians.”15 In his memoirs he adds 
the further possibility, that Hesketh-Prichard had been thought to be a danger to the Slovenes who 
sheltered him, or (“more sinister”) that he might have been killed at the behest of the Soviet 
mission with the partisans.16 That last view is not supported by a recent article which stresses the 
political motivation for his killing and concludes that the order came from the Slovene communist 
party leadership.17 After Hesketh-Pritchard’s name was added to the war monument of the 
partisans in the Carinthian town of Völkermarkt many decades later, Wilkinson thought that this 
“would have appealed to his sardonic sense of humour.”18 
 
Wilkinson in the early Cold War 
 
Wilkinson’s new job meant adapting to the shifts in the post-war world, as British foreign policy 
adapted. In one sense the adaption to the developing Cold War was probably not particularly 
difficult for someone of Wilkinson’s temperament and background. It required no abrupt shift 
from admiration of the Soviet Union or anti-facism to anti-communism. Whether Clowder itself 
had included an anti-communist purpose seems to me questionable but Wilkinson certainly did not 
need to learn dislike of Soviet Communism or mistrust of Soviet foreign policy or Stalin. In 
January 1945 he found himself in agreement with the designated British Political Advisor in 
Vienna (H.A.L. Mack) that the chances of a post-war cooperation with the Soviet Union in Austria 
were not good.19 At the time this judgment ran counter to the prevailing optimism of British 
Foreign Policy. But the point to make here is that neither Wilkinson nor Mack were expecting any 
significant increase in Austrian resistance in the closing months of the war. Both held what 
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Wilkinson called a “very realistic view” that there was little likelihood of Austrians “lifting a 
finger to work their passage.”20 In short, at this point viewing the Soviet Union as a potential threat 
appeared quite consistent with the recognition that Austrian resistance was limited. 
In the case of denazification, one of Wilkinson’s responsibilities in Vienna, both varieties of 
scepticism intersected. The lack of significant Austrian resistance meant that denazification was 
essentially an Allied (in particular a US) project imposed from above on Austrian society. Within 
British Military Government there was a basic disagreement between the “administrators” who 
wanted to get things going, as against the “policemen” (in the intelligence and security 
organisations) who wanted to make the purge more effective, or at least more extensive.21 As the 
former gained ground and economic reconstruction and social integration was prioritized over 
punishment, the Austrian input increased and denazification was transmuted into a party politics, 
involving the party political regulation of competition and patronage, which would later develop 
into the Proporz system. The process was both hastened and justified by a growing mistrust of 
Soviet intentions; so that in this respect Wilkinson’s earlier view became mainstream. His own 
position on denazification, insofar as it can be reconstructed, was informed by doubts about its 
bureaucratic nature (what he later called “Fragebogen and all that nonsense”22) and a growing 
acceptance of the political need to hand over responsibility to the Austrian authorities. At one 
meeting of the British Standing Committee on Denazification he argued that there was “fairly 
general agreement among the Austrians themselves that the less important Nazis would have to be 
reabsorbed in the community in some form or other, and consequently he did not think the 
Austrians would willingly accept any such proposals which would result in the perpetuation of an 
oppressed minority. From the political point of view he considered it preferable that the Austrians 
should formulate their own laws on the subject, and submit them for Allied consideration.”23 
Shortly afterwards he stressed “the necessity for the formulation of a British policy on which we 
could take a stand, and it was generally agreed that it was necessary to consider now plans for the 
rehabilitation of Nazis, as they could not remain cut off from the community indefinitely.”24  
At the same time doubts about where this was leading are hinted at. For example, Wilkinson 
registered his disagreement with the argument that the education of the young “should not be 
interfered with” stating that “this would seem the last thing to leave in Nazi hands!”25 In another 
case, he relayed his wife’s caustic views on a former Nazi seeking employment (“such an odious 
personality and was so unpleasant to her subordinates and so obsequious to her superiors […] 
showing all the least admirable Herrenvolk characteristics”). Interestingly he added that “she is 
just the type the Communists would like to get hold of – energetic, competent and ruthless.”26 The 
reasoning he deploys here against a reinstatement would soon shift into the standard Cold War 
argument for dismantling denazification: only the Soviet Union and its communist allies stood to 
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gain from a pool of able, disgruntled ex-Nazis. In that logic British policy in four power 
discussions developed into a default setting of laissez-faire, intended to “ensure that no 
unnecessary denazification is carried out.”27 
 
The Munich prism 
 
One way of managing this kind of adjustment was to fit it into the explanatory framework 
provided by the Munich agreement of September 1938. That meant in essence the judgment that 
the key to “dealing with” Stalin (and Tito) was not to show the kind of weakness which 
Chamberlain had shown.28 Chamberlain and his supporters were now marked as “the guilty men” 
and appeasement itself as “the greatest deviation from British policy that has occurred in the last 
150 years.”29 In the case of minority and border disputes the analogy extended to the claims to 
collective rights which, as seen through the “Munich lens” appeared little more than dangerous 
weapons in the hands of irredentists, manipulated by predatory neighbours.30 
Wilkinson was perhaps in a better position than most to judge the aptness of the analogy, having 
witnessed the death of appeasement in Prague in March 1939 at first hand and then seen British 
impotence in Poland at the outbreak of war in September.31 He was also better informed about the 
Carinthian Slovenes than most of his colleagues and in a position to see that their leaders were not 
really following in the footsteps of Konrad Henlein. His views are contained in a report he wrote 
in April 1946, which was triggered by a Foreign Office consideration of the possibilities of 
transferring the Slovene minority to Yugoslavia (in response to Yugoslav expulsions of ethnic 
Germans). The Munich analogy had been deployed in London to support the idea. For example, 
the senior Foreign Office official Oliver Harvey noted that “so long as the Slovene minority 
remains inside Austria they will be a possible source of intrigue against the integrity of the state, 
exactly like the Sudetens in Czechoslovakia.” Wilkinson, by contrast, reported that although the 
Slovene Liberation Front (Osvobodilna Fronta) was an irritating, vociferous group who had few 
grounds for complaint in security terms they amounted to no more than a nuisance.32 At least by 
implication He was questioning the aptness of the Sudeten analogy and, even more important, the 
appropriateness of the “Beneš solution” being mooted in London. Yet few months later he applied 
it himself in standard fashion and drawing directly on his personal experience when he commented 
on an Austrian police report of a meeting of the Liberation Front that it reminded him “strongly of 
life in Sudetenland in 1938.” His advice to the British military authorities in Carinthia was “to 
remind them that appeasement is no longer the policy of our Government.”33 
As viewed through the “Munich lens” Austria too appeared more clearly as a collective state 
victim, both in a retrospective view of the events of 1938 and as a potential victim of Soviet (and 
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Yugoslav) predation. It would be naïve to suppose that Austrian leaders and officials were not 
conscious of the usefulness of the analogy. A conversation between Wilkinson and the diplomat 
and lawyer Rudolf Blühdorn at the end of 1946 provides a rich example. Blühdorn (who had 
himself suffered persecution under the Third Reich because of a Jewish parent) was one of the 
main architects of the “victim thesis” which was developed within in the Austrian Foreign 
Ministry in 1945, not least in order to establish Austrian non-liability for Nazi persecution of the 
Jews. A year later the British draft preamble to the Austrian Treaty showed that this interpretation 
was not (yet) completely accepted by the Western Allies. It did state clearly that Austria had 
participated “in the war against the Allied and Associated Powers” even if  it had been 
“compelled” to do so.34 For Blühdorn the assumption of participation was objectionable because it 
was likely “significantly to reduce the practical value of the treaty for Austria” (den praktischen 
Wert des Vertrages für Österreich bedeutend herabzusetzen). He protested on the basis of his 
experience that “it was precisely those Austrians who were opposed to the Nazi regime who had 
fled to the German army, in order to be protected from the Nazi persecution. The real Nazis had 
been cosily sat around the home fire“ 
gerade diejenigen Österreicher, die gegen das Nazi-Regime eingestellt waren, sich in die deutsche 
Armee geflüchtet hätten, um vor den Nazi-Verfolgungen geschützt zu sein. Die wahren Nazi seien 
hübsch brav am heimischen Herd gesessen. Blühdorn then pointed to the collaboration in Western 
countries and finally to Czechoslovakia’s failure to offer military resistance to German rule and its 
contribution to the German war economy. Blühdorn found it odd (seltsam) that Austria, which had 
been fighting against German aspirations since 1933, or 1919, was now being reproached for 
having allowed itself to be occupied without a struggle in March 1938, while England and France 
had capitulated a year later in Munich. Wilkinson, reported Blühdorn, responded in agreement “he 
knew this quite precisely as he had himself been in the CSR in September 1938” (er wisse dies 
ganz genau, zumal er im September 1938 in der CSR gewesen sei).35 
Leaving the question of the accuracy of Blühdorn’s comments to one side, they are interesting for 
the way they use a particular memory of appeasement to associate Austria restrospectively with 
Czechoslovakia as a victim of Nazi Germany (while also seeking to undercut Czechoslovakia’s 
own claim to legitimacy as a victim state). Most importantly, they use the analogy to place his 
interlocutor on the defensive, and by implication question the legitimacy of any criticism of the 
Austrian “record.” The Cold War meant, as Gerald Stourzh puts it, that the “axiom of the liberated 
Austria in the sense of the Moscow declaration was becoming politically increasingly relevant” 
(dem politisch in Hinblick auf den Ost-West-Konflikt immer aktueller werdenden Postulat des 
befreiten Österreich im Sinne der Moskauer Deklaration).36 A kind of received wisdom about 
Austria became established in which the interpretation advanced by Wilkinson were eccentric, or 
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at any rate inopportune because they “played into Soviet hands.” In that sense Blühdorn had 
“history”, or at least the Cold War, on his side. 
 
From Cold War to Waldheim 
 
After leaving Vienna Wilkinson rose up the ladder of the British Foreign Service, serving in 
Washington, Bonn and in 1955 heading the secretariat of the Geneva summit. In 1963 he was 
given the plum position of Under Secretary at the Cabinet Office, which meant attending the 
cabinet discussions of the Macmillan government during the “Profumo Affair.” Then in 1970, after 
perhaps his most difficult posting in Saigon during the Vietnam War he returned to Vienna as 
British ambassador. 
 
By now although the “victim thesis” appeared well-established in Austria the activities of the 
extreme right raised some question marks about how well embedded  the values it transported 
were. But on the whole, neither Western nor Soviet observers were much interested in these 
questions, so long as it was a matter of Austrian domestic politics and not expressed in outright 
“pan-Germanism.” Wilkinson probably shared this narrow focus, but at the same time he was also 
confronted by his personal realization that some prominent members of Austria’s political elite had 
played prominent parts in the Third Reich.37 As for Austrian resistance he must have seen that the 
picture which was now being propagated (more assertively) by the Austrian state differed from his 
own sceptical assessment. And he knew that what resistance activity there had been was often not 
judged favorably. The case of Wolfgang Treichl is indicative here. Treichl had deserted from the 
Wehrmacht in North Africa, partly in response to the 1943 “Moscow Declaration” and was then 
recruited by SOE (cover name “Taggart”) for an undercover mission in Austria, only to be killed 
in Northern Italy when he was accidentally dropped into the arms of a German patrol.38 He was, as 
Wilkinson wrote in his memoirs, “an ardent Austrian patriot determined to assist the Allies in 
liberating his country from Nazi domination. He was a young man of great charm and integrity and 
we had the highest hopes that at least we had found someone of the right caliber to organize an 
effective Austrian resistance group.”39 
Treichl’s heroism is of course beyond question. But precisely because of its exceptional nature it 
does not remove the question mark over the extent to which national identity and hostility to 
National Socialism was able to motivate resistance.40 At any rate – to make the link to Wilkinson – 
it is striking that from 1946, when he became friends with Treichl’s brother Heinrich, until the 
early 1980s Wilkinson kept quite about the fact that the latter, now a prominent banker was the 
brother of a SOE agent. He did so, as he explained to me, for fear that making the connection 
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known could do Heinrich Treichl “harm.”41 In the early 1980s Wilkinson was relieved that “the cat 
was out of the bag.”  
 
By now attitudes had begun to change in Austria, especially in the younger generation. 
Nevertheless as the “Waldheim affair” showed, the process was conflictual and contradictory. The 
moral legitimacy of Austrian resistance despite being more explicitly underwritten by the state (for 
example in schools) was undercut by Waldheim’s famous assertion that in the Wehrmacht he had 
only been doing his duty. My own attempt to explore some of these contradictions in the pages of 
the Times Literary Supplement in 1986 takes me back to the Clowder Mission and to Wilkinson’s 
1971 despatch. I commented that Austrian resistance had been “much inflated”, adding that 
“despite the courage and heroism of those involved, whether Communists, Socialists, Catholics or 
Monarchists, it hardly amounted to a ‘movement’.”42 
I also asked whether post-war Austrian evasions could be seen as functionally necessary to the 
Austrian success story. In a private conversation the then Austrian Foreign Minister Peter 
Jankowitsch ticked me off, and shortly afterwards contacted several Austrian historians offering 
the support of the Ministry if they wished to take up a stand to correct my “hair-raising arguments” 
(haarsträubende Thesen). None did, though Gerald Stourzh registered – in a perfectly courteous 
fashion – several reservations about my article. The one most relevant here was his comment that 
my portrayal of Austrian resistance was “all too belittling” (allzu bagatellisierend).43 His unease 
can be read, at least in part, as an echo of Blühdorn’s 1946 objections to Wilkinson. Yet  
Wilkinson himself endorsed my interpretation shortly afterwards, writing to me that my TLS 
article had been “exactly the valedictory despatch which I ought to have written (but didn’t) when 
I left Vienna 1971.”44  
In the light of the trajectory I have sketched here it seems plausible to take this comment as an 
interpretation of the “gap” I identified  in that despatch at the start of this article: that is the gap 
between Wilkinson’s memory of his war-time efforts to stimulate Austrian resistance and 
Austria’s 1971 state of  “happiness.” In other words the later happy condition (famously described 
by the Pope as an “Island of the blessed”) had not been achieved because of the success of the 
efforts by Wilkinson and others to stimulate Austrian resistance but in spite of their failure. 
Furthermore, as the “Waldheim affair” would show, the situation in 1971 was indeed “too good to 
be true.” 
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